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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota was the breeding ground for judicial candidates’
newly won First Amendment rights and is now a testing ground for
the encroachment of partisanship into non-partisan judicial
1
elections. Litigation pressed by Minnesotans culminated in the
United States Supreme Court decision Republican Party of Minnesota
2
v. White, which freed judicial candidates to voice their views on
3
legal and political issues.
Now, more than five years later,
Minnesotans continue to debate the impact of that decision and
4
that of its progeny on the state’s judicial elections. The central
issue is whether increasing involvement of political parties and
related interests in judicial elections will diminish the judiciary’s
5
ability to be fair and impartial.
This article examines the judicial selection system established
by the state’s constitutional founders, a system largely intact today,
as well as the selection process that has developed in recent
6
decades. The article also presents court decisions expanding
judicial candidates’ rights to free political speech in their
campaigns, and examines how those decisions have affected
7
Minnesota’s elections to date. Finally, the article discusses the
threat of partisanship in judicial elections, the future of elections in
8
Minnesota, and potential reforms to deter partisanship.
II. THE FOUNDATION OF MINNESOTA’S JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEM
As Minnesota approached statehood, Republicans and
Democrats held separate conventions to draft the state’s
9
constitution in 1857. Convention delegates debated the potential
methods of selecting judges, and both conventions chose a system
of judicial elections, rather than the federal system of lifetime

1. See infra Part IV.
2. 536 U.S. 765, 774−75 (2002).
3. Id. at 788.
4. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.
5. See infra Part VII.
6. See infra Parts II, III.
7. See infra Parts IV, V.
8. See infra Parts VI, VIII.
9. See Laura Benson, The Minnesota Judicial Selection Process: Rejecting Judicial
Elections in Favor of a Merit Plan, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 765, 768 (1993)
(discussing the background of Minnesota’s judicial election process).
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10

appointments.
The constitution provided that “judges of the
11
supreme court shall be elected by the electors of the state at large”
and district judges “shall be elected by the electors [of the judicial
12
districts].”
The constitution also provided for appointment of
judges: “[i]n case the office of any judge shall become vacant
before the expiration of the regular term for which he was elected,
the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the governor until a
13
successor is elected and qualified.”
With minor exceptions, the system established at statehood
remains in place 150 years later. The term of office for judges was
originally set at seven years, but was reduced to six years by
14
The timing of the first
constitutional amendment in 1883.
election for an appointed judge was also changed. Originally,
judges ran for election “at the first annual election that occurs
15
more than thirty days after the vacancy shall have happened.” In
1956, a constitutional amendment changed this provision so that a
judge runs for election “at the next general election occurring
16
Currently, the
more than one year after [an] appointment.”
constitution provides:
The term of office of all judges shall be six years and until
their successors are qualified. They shall be elected by the
voters from the area which they are to serve in the manner
17
provided by law.
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of judge the
governor shall appoint in the manner provided by law a
qualified person to fill the vacancy until a successor is
elected and qualified. The successor shall be elected for a
six year term at the next general election occurring more
18
than one year after the appointment.
Thus, the constitution establishes a mixed system of
appointments and elections. The framers chose gubernatorial
appointments, rather than special elections, as the method for

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 768.
MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VI, § 3.
Id. at § 4.
Id. at § 10.
Act of March 1, 1883, 1883 Minn. Laws 9.
MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VI, § 10.
Act of April 15, 1955, ch. 881, 1955 Minn. Laws 1551.
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
Id. at § 8.
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19

filling vacancies occurring before the end of judges’ terms. Soon
after an appointment voters participate in the selection process,
20
deciding whether to elect the appointee to a full term.
In the first sixty years of statehood, elections played a greater
21
role in selection of Minnesota Supreme Court justices. Through
1917, half of the first thirty-two justices on the Minnesota Supreme
22
Court were elected to office rather than appointed. Since then,
appointments have predominated; only six out of the fifty-three
justices who have taken office since 1917 were first elected to their
23
positions.
Supreme Court elections in the first decades of statehood were
24
partisan contests. In 1912, however, the legislature “adopted a
25
non-partisan ballot” for judicial elections, and they have
26
continuously remained officially non-partisan. Finally, in 1949,
the legislature changed the form of ballots by placing the word
“incumbent” by the names of judges running for election, a
27
practice that remains in place today.
III. THE MODERN JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEM
A. Growth of the Minnesota Judiciary
As Minnesota has grown in population and complexity, the
judiciary has increased in both numbers and relative prominence.
In 1980, the Minnesota Supreme Court was comprised of nine
28
justices. Additionally, there were seventy-two district court judges
29
By 1987, the
and 134 municipal or county court judges.
municipal/county court system was merged into the district court

19. 1874 Minn. Laws 799.
20. Id.
21. Chronological List of Justices and Judges of the Minnesota Appellate
Courts, Minn. State Law Library Docket Series, http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/
judges.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Benson, supra note 9.
25. Gwenyth Jones, By The People? Judicial Selection in Minnesota, BENCH & B. OF
MINN. 18 (Feb. 1993).
26. Id.
27. MINN. STAT. § 204B.36, subdiv. 5 (2006); see also Jones, supra note 25, at
19.
28. MINN. LEGIS. MANUAL 352 (1981–82).
29. Id.
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system, and there were 217 district court judges.
In 1982
Minnesota voters approved a constitutional amendment
establishing an intermediate court of appeals, and the supreme
32
court was reduced to seven justices. By 2008, there will be 312
judges in Minnesota: seven supreme court justices, nineteen court
33
of appeals judges, and 286 district court judges.
As the number of judicial positions has increased, the
34
governor’s responsibilities in making appointments have grown.
35
An occasional gubernatorial task is now a monthly duty.
B. Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection
As they were called on to make more judicial appointments,
Minnesota governors created a process for screening judicial
candidates. Governors Al Quie and Rudy Perpich established
36
commissions “to assist them in choosing judges.” For decades, the
Minnesota State Bar Association and citizens’ groups lobbied for
the creation of an “independent commission to screen judicial
37
candidates based on merit.”
An opportunity to create such a
proposal arose because some criticized Governor Perpich’s judicial
38
appointments as excessively political.
In 1990, the Legislature
established the Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection to
30. MINN. STATE BAR ASS’N, FOR THE RECORD: 150 YEARS OF LAW & LAWYERS IN
MINNESOTA 174 (1999) [hereinafter FOR THE RECORD].
31. See generally MINN. LEGIS. MANUAL (1987–88).
32. MINN. STAT. §§ 480.01, 480.011 (2006); FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at
163.
33. 2007 Minn. Laws, ch. 54, art. 1, §§ 4–5, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 161
(West) (authorizing public safety appropriations for three new court of appeals
seats and seven new trial court seats).
34. See MINN. CONST. art. V, § 3.
35. During Governor Arne Carlson’s eight years in office (1991–99), he
appointed ninety-six district court judges. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 179.
Governor Jesse Ventura (1999–2003) appointed sixty district court judges. T.W.
Budig, Assistant Anoka County Attorney Sean Gibbs Appointed Tenth District Judge by
Gov.
Pawlenty,
HOMETOWN SOURCE,
Mar.
8,
2005,
available
at
http//:www.hometownsource.com/capitol/2005/march/8gibbs.html. In his first
term, Governor Tim Pawlenty (2003–07) appointed fifty-one district court judges.
See Minnesota Judicial Branch, Minnesota District Courts, http://www.mncourts.
gov/?page=238 (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
36. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 178.
37. Id.; see also Position Statement of Minnesota State Bar Association Judicial
Merit Selection Committee (Oct. 16, 1987) (“The MSBA supports a statutory merit
selection plan . . . .”)
38. Betty Wilson, Kelley Faults Perpich’s Choices for Judges, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Jan. 26, 1990, at B5.
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recruit, screen and recommend to the governor candidates for
39
appointment to the district courts.
The Commission consists of forty-nine members, including
nine at-large members and four members from each of the state’s
40
Of the at-large members, the governor
ten judicial districts.
41
appoints seven, and the supreme court appoints two.
The
governor and supreme court each appoint two members from each
42
judicial district. Three of the at-large members and two members
43
from each district cannot be attorneys. Thirteen members meet
to deliberate on each district court vacancy. The nine at-large
members are joined by the four members from the judicial district
44
in which the vacancy occurs.
The statute creating the Commission requires consideration of
several factors in screening candidates: “integrity, maturity, health
if job related, judicial temperament, diligence, legal knowledge,
45
ability and experience, and community service.” After reviewing
applications, conducting background checks, and interviewing
candidates, the Commission recommends three to five finalists for
each vacant position, and forwards those recommendations to the
46
governor. The Commission seeks and receives significant input
47
from the public while screening candidates.
Since the
Commission’s inception, governors have interviewed the finalists
48
personally to select their appointees.
While governors have constitutional authority to appoint any
qualified person as a judge, they have nearly without exception
49
chosen a finalist named by the Commission. The Commission has
become recognized as a vital part of the selection process, helping

39. Elections and Ethics Reform Act, 1990 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 608 (West)
(codified as Minn. Stat. § 480B.01 (2006)).
40. MINN. STAT. § 480B.01, subdiv. 2 (2006).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at subdiv. 3.
45. Id. at subdiv. 8.
46. Id.
47. Id. at subdiv. 10. See also Office of the Minnesota Governor, Tim Pawlenty:
Commission on Judicial Selection, http://www.governor.state.mn.us/media
center/pressreleases/JudicialSelections/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2007).
48. George Soule, Judicial Appointments in the Ventura Administration, 68
HENNEPIN LAW., Nov. 1999 at 4; James H. Gilbert, The Appointment System Is Working
Well, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 1993 at 22, 26.
49. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 179.
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to reduce politicization and promote merit-based selection. If the
governor stacked the Commission with partisans, routinely ignored
the Commission’s recommendations, or appointed unqualified
political allies, the governor likely would pay the price in public
opinion.
The Commission’s role is confined to recommending
candidates for appointment to the district court, and not the
51
appellate courts. Recent governors have formed Commission-like
committees to screen candidates for the court of appeals and
52
supreme court.
This process is not governed by Minnesota
53
statutes.
The vast majority of judges in Minnesota attain their office
54
Often, judges reach
through appointment by the governor.
retirement age or decide to resign in the midst of a six year term,
55
triggering a vacancy and gubernatorial appointment.
A few
judges have timed their departures to ensure that the governor can
56
appoint a successor, rather than open the position for election.
In 2003, ninety-one percent of trial and appellate judges were
initially appointed by the governor, including six out of seven
57
supreme court justices.
C. Judicial Elections
Elections play a vital role in the judicial selection process.
Elections provide a safety valve, a method for voters to replace a
judge who has committed moral or ethical breaches or has not
58
Elections make judges broadly
performed adequately.

50. Id.
51. See About the Commission on Judicial Selection, http://www.governor.
state.mn.us/mediacenter/pressreleases/JudicialSelections/PROD007916.html.
The Commission also screens candidates for the Workers’ Compensation Court of
Appeals. See MINN. STAT. §480B.01 subdiv. 1 (2006) (“If a judge of the district court
or Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals dies, resigns, retires, or is removed
during the judge's term of office, or if a new district or Workers' Compensation
Court of Appeals judgeship is created, the resulting vacancy must be filled by the
governor as provided in this section.”).
52. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 178.
53. Id.
54. Pam Louwagie, Voters in Judicial Elections Just Go Through the Motions, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 3, 2003 at A1.
55. Id. at A18.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 30, at 177.
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accountable to the people they serve. If judges perform poorly, it is
more likely they will draw opponents for election.
In recent elections, most judges have run unopposed to retain
their seats. In the six elections from 1996 through 2006, only
thirty-one percent of Minnesota appellate judges, and eleven
59
percent of district judges, have drawn opponents. In the last six
elections, there have been only seven open seats, all for the district
60
court, up for election. Supreme Court Justice Alan Page won the
61
most recent open seat on an appellate court in 1992. None of the
62
appellate judges running from 1996 to date were defeated.
Challengers defeated only five district court judges during this
63
same period.
Spending by candidates in contested judicial elections has
been modest compared to spending by candidates for legislative or
executive positions or by judicial candidates in partisan election
states. In the last six elections, incumbent appellate judges spent
64
an average of $87,430 on campaigns in contested elections.
65
Appellate challengers spent an average of $4147. In district court
races, incumbents spent an average of $19,359 in contested
66
elections, while challengers spent an average of $9903.
Former Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Edward Stringer
spent the most money by a judicial candidate during this period:
67
$305,616 in winning fifty-four percent of the vote in 1996. Only
three other campaigns have exceeded $100,000 in spending:
former supreme court Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz ($138,595) and
68
Justice James Gilbert ($196,853) in 2000, and Susan Burke
59. Data compiled from Minnesota Secretary of State election results
[hereinafter SOS Election Results] (on file with author).
60. Id.
61. See Minnesota State Law Library: Chronological List of Justices and Judges
of the Minnesota Appellate Courts, http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judges.
html (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
62. SOS Election Results, supra note 59.
63. Id.
64. See MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN
FINANCE SUMMARIES, available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/all_pubs.htm
[hereinafter 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARIES] (summary spreadsheets
on file with author).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 1996 CAMPAIGN FINANCE
SUMMARY, tbl. E (1997), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/
Summary/CFSM_96.pdf; SOS Election Results, supra note 59.
68. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 2000 CAMPAIGN FINANCE

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/9

8

Soule: The Threats of Partisanship to Minnesota's Judicial Elections
8. SOULE - ADC.DOC

2008]

2/3/2008 3:54:10 PM

JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

709

($112,938), a successful candidate for an open seat on the
69
Hennepin County District Court in 2004.
The spending by most challengers in appellate and district
70
court elections was minimal or even non-existent. In 42 races,
challengers spent less than $5,000, many spending so little that they
71
did not need to file a campaign finance disclosure report.
Expenditures by candidates for open district court seats tended to
72
be higher than by other district court candidates. In races for the
73
seven open seats, eight candidates spent more than $40,000 each.
Several district court candidates largely self-financed their efforts,
74
investing significant personal funds in their campaigns.
D. The Model of Non-Partisanship
Since the 1912 enactment of legislation making judicial
75
elections non-partisan, Minnesota’s judicial elections have been
largely devoid of partisanship. The Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct contained a number of restrictions to enforce nonpartisanship in judicial campaigns. Since 1974, the Code included
the Announce Clause, which provided that a judicial candidate
shall not “announce his or her views on disputed legal or political
76
issues.”
The Code also prohibited a judicial candidate’s
SUMMARY (2000), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/Summary/
summary00/index.html.
69. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB. DISCLOSURE BD., 2004 CAMPAIGN FINANCE
SUMMARY, at 27–28 (2005), available at http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/
Summary/CFSUMM2004.pdf.
70. See 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARIES, supra note 64.
71. Id. A candidate “must begin to file the reports required by this section in
the first year it receives contributions or makes expenditures in excess of $100 and
must continue to file until the committee, fund, or party unit is terminated.”
MINN. STAT. § 10A.20, subdiv. 1 (2006).
72. 1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARIES, supra note 64.
73. Id.
74. In 2004, Susan Burke made personal contributions of $81,644 to her
campaign, which spent a total of $112,938. MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. & PUB.
DISCLOSURE BD., 2004 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARY, at 27–28 (2005), available at
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/Summary/CFSUMM2004.pdf. Candidate John Mellbye contributed all of the money he spent on his 2006 campaign:
$56,246. Letter from John Mellbye, Judge, to Joyce Larson, Campaign Finance &
Public Disclosure Board (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://www.cfbreport.state.
mn.us/pdfStorage/2006/CampFin/YE/1409.pdf.
75. See supra Part II.
76. The Announce Clause went further than the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, which in 1990 replaced the Announce Clause with a prohibition on
statements by judicial candidates “that commit or appear to commit the candidate
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involvement in political party activities, appeals for support by
political parties, or use of political party support in a judicial
77
campaign.
In the 1990s, there were efforts to involve political parties in
judicial elections. The Code of Judicial Conduct did not and could
not preclude political parties from promoting candidates in judicial
elections. In 1998, the Republican Party of Minnesota amended its
78
constitution to permit endorsements of judicial candidates,
although the Party voted not to endorse candidates for the
79
Minnesota Supreme Court in that year’s election.
At its 2000 state convention, the Republican Party issued its
first modern endorsements for appellate court candidates. The
party endorsed Gregory Wersal in his challenge to supreme court
Justice James Gilbert—who had been appointed to the court by
Republican Governor Arne Carlson—and court of appeals judges
80
G. Barry Anderson, Jill Halbrooks and James Harten. The court
of appeals judges rejected the endorsements and requested the
81
party not include them in any campaign activities.
While the
Republican Party was free to promote its endorsement of Mr.
Wersal, the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibited his use of the
82
endorsement. Justice Gilbert prevailed in the election, winning
83
sixty-nine percent of the vote.
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH FOR JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
A. Federal Court Decisions
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, two-time Minnesota

with respect to cases, controversies or issues likely to come before the court.”
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000), cited in
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 773 n.5 (2002).
77. See David Schultz, Judicial Selection in Minnesota: Options After Republican
Party v. White, BENCH & B. MINN. 17 (Nov. 2005).
78. Robert Whereatt, GOP Weighs Whether to Endorse Judicial Candidates, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 14, 2002, at 20A.
79. Conrad deFiebre, In Close Vote, Delegates Reject Endorsing Judicial Candidates,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 21, 1998, at 13A.
80. Robert Whereatt, Republicans Make First Endorsements for a Supreme Court
Justice, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 11, 2000, at 14A.
81. Robert Whereatt, Endorsed Judges Tell GOP to Stay Clear, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), June 13, 2000, at 1B.
82. MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1), (A)(3)(d)(i).
83. SOS Election Results, supra note 59.
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Supreme Court candidate Gregory Wersal and the state’s
Republican Party challenged Minnesota’s Announce Clause on
84
First Amendment grounds. Mr. Wersal claimed he was forced to
abandon his 1996 election bid because of an ethics complaint
stemming from his criticism of several recent Minnesota Supreme
85
Court decisions. In 1998, Mr. Wersal renewed his bid for the
86
bench. This time, however, Wersal sought an advisory opinion
from the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board
seeking to determine whether he would again face scrutiny for
87
expressing his views. When the Board refused to issue an opinion,
Wersal, along with the Republican Party of Minnesota, brought suit
88
in federal court.
The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, upholding the constitutionality of the Announce
89
Clause, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In June
2002 the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of
90
In
appeals decision and struck down the Announce Clause.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme Court held that
the Announce Clause violated the First Amendment because it was
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in
preserving the state judiciary’s impartiality and appearance of
91
impartiality.
After remand of the White case, the plaintiffs continued their
efforts to purge Minnesota’s restrictions on partisan activities in
92
judicial elections. The plaintiffs prevailed again in August 2005
when the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, struck
down the Partisan-Activities Clause and the Solicitation Clause of
93
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct. The court of appeals
invalidated rules that judicial candidates could not identify
themselves as members of a political party, attend or speak at
84. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768–69; Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 746 (8th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. denied,
2006 WL 152093 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2006).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn.
1999), aff’d, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001).
90. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 766.
91. Id.
92. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004).
93. Republican Party of Minn., 416 F.3d at 744.
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political gatherings, or seek, accept or use political party
94
endorsements. The court also invalidated the Solicitation Clause
to the extent that it prohibited candidates from soliciting
contributions by speaking to a large group or in signing a
95
campaign letter. The plaintiffs had not challenged the restriction
on a candidate personally soliciting contributions from
96
individuals.
Other courts have also ruled on the constitutionality of
restrictions on judicial campaign activities. In Weaver v. Bonner, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck down provisions of the
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited judicial
candidates from (a) making communications that are false or
contain a material misrepresentation, and (b) personally soliciting
97
campaign contributions and publicly stated support. The court
stated that the First Amendment protects false communications
unless they are made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
98
disregard as to whether they are false.
Several federal courts have also struck down the Pledges and
Promises and Commitment Clauses of state judicial conduct
99
codes. The courts held that rules prohibiting judicial candidates
from making pledges or promises of conduct other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office, or

94. Id. at 763–66.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 765.
97. 309 F.3d 1312, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
98. Id.
99. Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879 (N.D. Ind.
2006); Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan 2006); Ala.
Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Alaska
2005); N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. N.D. 2005); Family
Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004). But see
Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d. 968 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (holding that
Wisconsin’s Pledges, Promises, and Commitments Clause was constitutionally
permissible even though a particular recusal provision was void for vagueness and
overbreadth); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003)(upholding disciplinary
charges against judge for campaign statements such as “[p]olice officers expect
judges . . . to help law enforcement by putting criminals where they belong . . .
behind bars” as “pledges or promises” of conduct in office, which violated the
state’s Code of Judicial Conduct, not protected by the First Amendment); In re
Watson, 763 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. 2003) (upholding disciplinary charges against
judge who stated during his campaign that “[w]e are in desperate need of a judge
who will work with police, not against them. We need a judge who will assist our
law enforcement officers as they aggressively work towards cleaning up our city
streets” as pledges and promises that are not protected by the First Amendment).
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statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
100
before the court, violated the First Amendment.
Each of the
courts sustained code provisions that require a judge to disqualify
himself or herself in any proceeding in which his or her
101
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
B.

Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct

The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken a conservative
approach in amending the state’s Code of Judicial Conduct in
response to the White decisions. The court issued rule changes
after each White decision. In the first round, in September 2004,
the court deleted the Announce Clause, clarified the Pledges and
Promises Clause, and amended the prohibition on candidate
misrepresentations by banning false campaign statements only if
they were made “knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the
102
truth.”
The court also added a provision requiring a judge to
disqualify himself or herself where “the judge, while a judge or a
candidate for judicial office, has made a public statement that
commits the judge with respect to: (i) an issue in the proceeding;
103
or (ii) the controversy in the proceeding.” The court “decline[d]
to adopt the . . . amendments [recommended by an advisory
committee] expanding the scope of permissible partisan political
activity. . . . [W]e are not convinced the recommended changes
104
are either necessary or desirable on their merits.”
The second round of rule changes was made in March 2006.
The court struck down provisions that precluded judicial
candidates from identifying themselves as members of a political
organization, attending or making speeches to political gatherings,
105
or seeking or using endorsements from political organizations.
The court also amended the Code to allow judicial candidates to
personally solicit publicly stated support from individuals and
106
organizations.
While the former Code completely prohibited
100. See cases cited supra note 99.
101. Id.
102. Order In re Amendment of the Code of Judicial Conduct, No. C4-85-697
(Sept. 14, 2004).
103. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(1)(e) (2007).
104. Order In re Amendments of the Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 102.
105. Order In re Amendments of the Code of Judicial Conduct, No. C4-85-697
(Mar. 29, 2006).
106. Id.
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candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions, the
amendments permit a candidate to “make a general request for
campaign contributions when speaking to an audience of 20 or
more people; and . . . sign letters, for distribution by the
candidate’s
campaign
committee,
soliciting
campaign
107
contributions . . . .”
The campaign still must ensure that the
candidate will not learn the identity of those who made
contributions to the campaign, or those who were solicited but did
108
not contribute.
Going into the 2008 elections, candidates will be permitted to
109
But, unless the
engage in a wide range of political activities.
court issues additional changes, candidates will not be able to
personally solicit or receive campaign contributions from
individuals or make pledges or promises “with respect to cases,
110
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court.”
In addition, a candidate risks disqualification as the judge in a
proceeding if he or she makes a “public statement that commits the
judge with respect to . . . an issue . . . or the controversy in the
111
proceeding.
V. POST-WHITE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN MINNESOTA
The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in White was
112
announced on June 27, 2002.
While White opened the door to
some partisan campaign activity, Minnesota’s judicial campaigns in
2002, 2004 and 2006 did not change significantly from those in
prior years.
The number of contested judicial elections has not increased.
In the 2004 and 2006 elections, three supreme court justices ran
113
without challengers.
Only eight percent of district court judges
114
Spending on
up for election in those years drew opponents.
judicial races also has not changed appreciably since the White

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Barbara L. Jones, With “White” Now the Law, Judicial Races are in for a
Change, MINN. LAWYER, Jan. 30, 2006, http://www.minnlawyer.com/story.cfm?id=
4848.
110. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d) (2007).
111. Id. at 3(D)(1)(e).
112. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
113. SOS Election Results, supra note 59.
114. Id.
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115

decision. The only exception was that in 2006 three challengers
to district court judges were well-funded, each spending more than
116
$30,000.
In the post-White elections, there has been little partisan
activity and judicial candidates have focused principally on their
117
qualifications and experience.
There have been a few minor
exceptions. Bemidji lawyer Tim Tinglestad ran for the supreme
118
The
court in 2004 on a conservative, faith-based platform.
Minnesota Family Council published a voter’s guide that year,
focused on issues such as taxpayer funding of abortion, the right to
119
Although the
assisted suicide, and same-sex marriage.
Republican Party did not endorse any judicial candidates in 2004, it
issued a voter’s guide—“a brief overview of relevant facts relating to
[judicial candidates’] qualifications and abilities to be a member of
120
the judiciary.”
In 2006, the Republican Party endorsed Justice G. Barry
Anderson and Court of Appeals Judges Christopher Dietzen and
121
Gordon Shumaker. All three declined the endorsements.
Only
two candidates for the district court sought and obtained political
party endorsement, both Republicans: State Representative Scott
Newman in the First Judicial District, and Child Support Magistrate
122
In the Second
Tim Tingelstad in the Ninth Judicial District.
Judicial District, St. Paul City Council Member Jay Benanav often
reminded voters of his DFL background, and called his opponent
123
Judge Elena Ostby a “Republican appointee.”

115.
116.
117.

1996 to 2006 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARIES, supra note 64.
Id.
See George Soule, Judicial Election in Minnesota: Past, Present, and Future,
HENNEPIN LAW., Jan. 2007 at 7.
118. Brad Swenson, Tingelstad Says Judges Must Serve Up Impartial Justice, BEMIDJI
PIONEER, Sept. 10, 2006, at A15.
119. See MINN. FAMILY INST., VOTER’S GUIDE 2004 (on file with author).
120. See REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINN., STATEWIDE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS VOTER
GUIDE (2004) (detailing the judicial candidates’ educational and professional
backgrounds, some of their community involvements, and some excerpts from
their opinions) (on file with author).
121. Conrad deFiebre, Republican State Convention: Notebook; GOP Delegates Want
Voter OK on Stadium Tax, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 3, 2006, at 8A.
122. Swenson, supra note 118; Michelle Lore, Eight Judicial Seats Contested,
MINN. LAWYER, July 24, 2006, available at http://www.minnlawyer.com/story.cfm?
ID=28898.
123. Shannon Prather, Judicial Candidates Spar Over Politics, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS (Minnesota), Oct. 27, 2006, at 1B.
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There was some evidence in Minnesota’s 2006 elections that
124
voters penalized candidates for their partisan campaign activities.
Mr. Newman drew criticism for seeking partisan support, and later
125
in the campaign he rarely featured his Republican endorsement.
Judge Michael Savre defeated Mr. Newman, fifty-six percent to
126
forty-four percent.
Mr. Tingelstad placed third in the primary
127
Despite widespread name
election, ending his candidacy.
recognition, Mr. Benanav lost the election to Judge Ostby, fifty128
eight percent to forty-one percent.
Nationally, candidates who
focused on political or disputed legal issues “lost more often than
129
they won.”
VI. THE THREATS OF PARTISANSHIP
A. Supreme Court Races in Partisan Election States
In considering what Minnesota may face if judicial elections
become more partisan, recent races in partisan election states
provide a ready source of information. In ten states, candidates are
commonly identified with a political party or seek judicial election
130
on partisan ballots. There are several recent examples of partisan
slugfests in these states.
One race in Illinois in 2004 set a national record for spending
in a single state supreme court race; the candidates in Illinois’s
Fifth Judicial District, a rural district in southern Illinois, raised
131
more than $9.3 million.
Business interests supporting
Republican Judge Lloyd Karmeier and plaintiffs’ lawyers and labor
groups supporting Democratic Judge Gordon Maag poured
132
millions of dollars into the race.
124.
125.

See infra text and accompanying notes 125–29.
See Lee Ostrom, Editorial, Need To Ensure Judicial Independence, MCLEOD
COUNTY CHRON., Apr. 21, 2006.
126. SOS Election Results, supra note 64.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006 35
(Jesse Rutledge ed., 4th ed. 2007).
130. Id. at 25 (partisan election states are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana,
Michigan, North Carolina, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and West
Virginia).
131. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: 2004
18 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 3d ed. 2005).
132. Id. at 19.
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In Alabama, races for the supreme court are often expensive,
133
In June 2006, a slate of “pick-and-choose”
partisan free-for-alls.
134
candidates ran against incumbent Republican justices.
The
challengers were so called because they contended that the
Alabama Supreme Court should not obey rulings of the United
135
States Supreme Court with which the Alabama justices disagreed.
In particular, they urged defiance of the United States Supreme
Court decision that banned the death penalty for defendants
136
The
convicted of murders committed when they were minors.
challengers were led by Justice Tom Parker, a follower of former
137
Chief Justice Roy Moore.
Campaign messages based on hot-button political issues were
138
Chief Justice Drayton
common in the 2006 Alabama races.
Nabers, for example, told voters that “[i]ssues relating to the right
to life and the sanctity of marriage are in the soul of Alabamians,
139
and they want a judge who shares their conservative views.”
Justice Parker accused Chief Justice Nabers of backing “the same
precedents that allow abortion up to the date of delivery” and
“would enforce a federal court order mandating Alabama legalize
140
gay marriages.”
The “pick-and-choose” candidates all lost in the June
141
but the Republican incumbents faced Democratic
primary,
142
Candidates spent $8.2
challengers in the general election.
143
million in the supreme court races.
Chief Justice Nabers alone
spent more than $4 million on his campaign, but he lost in the
133. See Drew Jubera, There’s Nothing Civil About Alabama Judicial Race, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., June 5, 2006, at A2.
134. See Geri L. Dreiling, Pick and Choose Judicial Candidates Defeated: Alabama
Voters Reject Slate That Argued It Could Ignore U.S. Supreme Court Rulings, ABA J., June
9, 2006, available at http://www.abanet.org/journal.ereport.jn9parker.html.
135. Id.
136. Tom Parker, Editorial, Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial Activism,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 1, 2005, available at http://www.alliancealert.org/2006/
20060106.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
137. See SAMPLE ET AL, supra note 129, at 4.
138. See Jubera, supra note 133.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See generally Ala. Sec’y of State, Alabama Secretary of State 2004 Republican
Primary Results, http://www.sos.state.al.us/downloads/dl3.aspx?trgturl=election/
2004/primary/repcert-amend-6-11-2004.pdf&trgtfile=repcert-amend-6-11-2004.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
142. See Brendan Kirby, Supreme Court Incumbents Fend Off Challenges, ALA. PRESSREGISTER, June 7, 2006 at A1.
143. SAMPLE ET AL, supra note 129, at 5.
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144

general election to his Democratic opponent. The winner, Chief
145
Justice Sue Bell Cobb, called the cost of the campaigns “obscene.”
B. Partisan Trial Court Races
Party politics often shape elections for local trial court seats in
partisan election states. The experience of Dallas County, Texas in
2006 is instructive. Before the 2006 election, all of the district
146
In 2006, however, Democrats
judges were Republicans.
147
Democratic challengers defeated
dominated county elections.
148
In eight contests for open seats,
twenty Republican judges.
149
Democrats defeated Republicans.
Five Republican judges
150
retained their positions because they ran unopposed.
Before the election, the Republican bench likely was varied in
qualifications and competence, and the same is true about the
151
largely Democratic bench after the election. Their selection had
much to do about politics and little to do with merit: “Judging by
the voting percentages in judicial races, the voters didn’t
differentiate between the good and bad Democrats, nor the good
and bad Republicans, opting for a wholesale party swap without
152
regard to each candidate’s particular qualifications.” This type of
partisan turnover in the judiciary detracts from stability of the
bench and may discourage some of the best candidates from
seeking appointment or election.
C. The Wisconsin Experience—2007
States like Illinois, Alabama and Texas are well known for
partisanship in judicial elections. Minnesota can also look to other

144. Phillip Rawls, Court Race Most Expensive in America, DECATUR DAILY, Feb. 2,
2007.
145. Id.
146. See Tex. Sec’y of State, 2002 General Election Dallas County Race Summary,
http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
147. Matt Pulle, Accidental Victors, DALLAS OBSERVER, Nov. 16, 2006, available at
www.dallasobserver.com/2006-11-16/news/accidental-victors/full (“Last Tuesday,
local Democrats . . . beat Republicans in every contested countywide race, as a
rather lazy electorate lumped civil judges and obscure administrators with an
unpopular war and president.”).
148. See Tex. Sec’y State, supra note 146.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Pulle, supra note 147.
152. Id.
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Midwestern states with similar demographics and political outlook
to consider whether partisanship can dominate judicial elections.
The April 2007 election for an open seat on the Wisconsin
Supreme Court is informative.
In the election, Circuit Judge Annette Ziegler defeated
Madison private lawyer Linda Clifford fifty-eight percent to forty153
two percent to replace a retiring Supreme Court justice.
Although Wisconsin’s judicial elections are non-partisan, Ziegler
was identified as the Republican candidate, while Clifford was
154
known as the Democratic candidate. The race cost a total of $6
155
The candidates each raised over $1 million for their
million.
156
campaigns, including each candidate’s own “six-figure” loan. The
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce and Club for Growth
Wisconsin spent over $2 million in support of Ziegler, while
“Democrat-leaning” Greater Wisconsin Committee spent $320,000
157
The business groups were apparently
on ads for Clifford.
motivated by recent decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that
“struck down caps on medical malpractice damages” and that
allowed “a lawsuit against the lead-paint industry [to] continue”
158
even without product identification.
The victor in the race, Judge Ziegler, acknowledged that “the
tone of the race troubled her, and that she wished third parties
159
Candidate Clifford felt
would stay out of judicial contests.”
“disappointed in the fact that judicial elections in our state are now
160
so overwhelmed by money . . . .”
Nevertheless, the Wisconsin
Manufacturers & Commerce reportedly views the next election as
161
“an opportunity to solidify a conservative majority” on the court.

153. Wisconsin State Elections Board, Results of Spring General Election,
http://elections.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=11121&locid=47 (last visited Dec.
27, 2007).
154. See Patrick Marley, Ziegler Wins Court Seat, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 4,
2007, at A1.
155. Patrick Marley, Pricey Court Race Might Set New Pace, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2007, at B1.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Marley, supra note 154.
161. Id.
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D. Characteristics of Partisan Judicial Elections
The campaign participants and methods are often the same in
partisan supreme court elections. In recent years, business
interests have squared off against plaintiffs’ lawyers and labor
162
groups in supporting competing candidates. Many such elections
have featured abundant television advertising, negative
163
campaigning, and criticism of judges’ opinions in criminal cases.
Spending on television advertising in 2006 supreme court races
164
In contested supreme court elections since
topped $16 million.
2000, only Minnesota and North Dakota have not featured
165
television advertising.
Many of the advertisements—sponsored by interest groups and
by candidates—are attack ads, well known to voters in races for
166
executive and legislative offices.
Negative ads often feature
criminal cases, even though their sponsors may have other
motivations. For example, in the 2004 election for West Virginia
Supreme Court, a group financed by business ran advertisements
accusing Justice Warren McGraw of “having assigned a known sex167
offender to work in a West Virginia high school.”
Another growing factor in judicial elections is requests by
interest groups for judicial candidates to declare their views on
168
judicial and political issues. Conservative groups have distributed
most questionnaires that often focus on issues such as abortion,
169
Such groups publish and
school choice and same-sex marriage.
circulate responses, or a candidate’s lack of response, to their
170
members.
Most judicial candidates have declined to respond to
171
issue-oriented questionnaires.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

SAMPLE ET AL, supra note 129, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 131, at 4.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 29.
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VII. THE FUTURE OF MINNESOTA’S JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
A. Threats of Partisanship to Minnesota’s Judiciary
Minnesotans are now wrestling with two issues: whether
increasing partisanship in judicial elections would harm the state’s
judiciary and citizens, and whether the partisanship displayed in
other states is likely to materialize in Minnesota’s judicial elections.
There is a lively debate on the first issue between the First
Amendment activists—mostly Republicans or conservatives—and
the state’s legal community. The proponents of partisan elections
contend that “politicizing the process [will] inform voters better
172
They argue that “free and
about candidates for the bench.”
open” elections are necessary to prevent judicial activism and
173
promote accountability.
The prevailing position in the legal community is represented
by the findings of the Citizens Commission for the Preservation of
an Impartial Judiciary. In response to changes fostered by White
and its progeny, the Commission was formed in February 2006 “to
review and make recommendations concerning the method of
174
selection of Minnesota’s state court judges.” Former Governor Al
Quie chaired the Commission, consisting of five judges and twentyfive other members from the legal, business, labor and education
175
communities.
After a one-year study of the Minnesota system and the new
judicial campaign freedoms, the Commission identified several
176
These threats
“threats to our system of nonpartisan elections.”
included turning “Minnesota’s system of nonpartisan elections into
partisan elections,” “pressing [candidates] to solicit financial
support from those likely to have interests” in cases, allowing
political parties and interests to elect judges to serve their “interests
rather than follow the rule of law,” increasing the cost of judicial
campaigns, inviting “interests to fund campaigns for the purpose of
influencing judicial decisions,” and promoting negative

172. deFiebre, supra note 121.
173. William F. Mohrman, Wersal’s Attorney Responds to Blatz, MINN. LAWYER,
June 19, 2000, at 3, 10.
174. CITIZENS COMM’N FOR THE PRES. OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007) [hereinafter CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT].
175. Id.
176. Id. at 5.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9
8. SOULE - ADC.DOC

722

2/3/2008 3:54:10 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

177

campaigning and television advertising.
These activities
178
“threaten a litigant’s fair day in court.”
They also impair the core functions of courts to protect
individual rights and liberties, check the legislative and
executive branches to ensure they act within the bounds
of their authority, protect and uphold the Minnesota and
U.S. Constitutions, protect and uphold federal and state
laws, and preserve and promote our democratic system of
179
government.
Judicial independence is the principle that judges should
reach legal decisions free from outside pressures, strictly according
180
to the law, and without fear of reprisal.
If judges are
181
independent, fair and impartial, then justice will be served.
Excessive partisanship in the selection process threatens judicial
independence. Justice may be impaired when judges think about
how a decision may affect partisans or special interests, what
campaign contributions may be gained or lost, or how a ruling may
sit with the legislature. Judicial independence is not absolute, but
must be balanced with accountability.
Partisan judicial elections focused on the hot-button issues of
the day may also deceive voters. Minnesota courts, especially
district courts, rarely if ever issue rulings on issues such as abortion,
182
Campaigns based on these
gun control or same-sex marriage.
issues may disingenuously distract voters from real issues, such as
qualifications, experience, demeanor, and philosophy. In addition,
a candidate who takes positions on divisive issues may be

177. Id. at 5–6.
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id.
180. Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. 1992).
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., Women of the State v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995)
(holding that state statutes restricting women’s use of public assistance funds for
therapeutic abortions were unconstitutional); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318
(Minn. 1990) (answering certified question that the state unborn child homicide
statutes were constitutional); Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10
(Minn. 1986) (holding state statute barring wrongful birth actions was
constitutional); In re Application of Atkinson, 219 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1980)
(commenting on standards for gun permits); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971) (stating that state statute did not authorize marriage between
same-sex couples); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (upholding judgment enjoining city from extending health benefits to
partners of employees in same-sex domestic partnerships).
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disqualified from presiding over proceedings involving those
183
issues.
Turning judicial elections into partisan battlegrounds,
targeted by special interests with large war chests, may provide a
significant disincentive for prospective judicial candidates. Many
lawyers who would be good judges have little political background
184
and are wary of running a high-profile election campaign. They
185
want to focus on being good judges, not politicians. If elections
turn out to be partisan, expensive battles, many qualified judicial
186
candidates may be deterred.
B. The Encroachment of Partisanship in Minnesota’s Judicial Elections
As the First Amendment litigation and Republican Party
endorsements have shown, there are legal and political activists
187
pushing for more partisanship in Minnesota’s judicial elections.
While these activists have succeeded in changing the rules of
judicial elections, both in-state and nationally, they have not yet
188
significantly affected the state’s judicial campaigns or elections.
There are a number of factors that will impede efforts to
politicize Minnesota’s judicial elections. First, because judicial
offices are non-partisan, party affiliations of candidates will not
189
appear on the ballot like they do in partisan election states.
Second, the state has developed a culture of non-partisanship in its
judiciary, an outlook firmly held by the majority of the state’s legal
190
Third, Minnesota courts have not ruled on many
community.
191
hot-button issues in recent years. Finally, the movement to make
judicial elections more partisan has not gained traction in the
state’s business community. While business groups are active in
183. See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(1)(e) (2007). See
generally 10 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST Courts § 5.08 (5th ed. 2003) (detailing general
information on disqualification of judges for bias and interpreting the judicial
code).
184. See Peterson, 490 N.W.2d at 422–423.
185. See id. (noting that practitioners fear giving up their livelihoods “only to
be defeated by a politician with a popular name at some future election”).
186. See id.
187. See supra Parts IV, V.
188. See supra Part V.
189. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 4.
190. See id. (the Commission recommended changes to the judicial selection
process in Minnesota to preserve non-partisanship after federal court decisions
granted rights to candidates to run partisan campaigns).
191. See supra note 182.
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partisan elections in other states, the business community in
Minnesota appears to be quite content with the state’s judiciary. A
recent study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for
Legal Reform ranked Minnesota’s court system second in the
192
nation for its “fairness in the litigation environment.”
While these factors may stabilize non-partisan judicial elections
in the next several years, the state will likely lose its immunity from
partisanship.
A society deeply divided by many social and
economic issues, and prone to resolve many disputes by lawsuits,
may force the courts to make rulings that will disappoint one side
or the other. Nationally, and at the State Capitol, the winds of
partisanship blow strongly. It is doubtful that tradition and culture
193
can resist these political factors for many years to come.
VIII.

POTENTIAL REFORMS TO DETER PARTISAN ELECTIONS

A. Changes to the Selection Process
The Citizens Commission for the Preservation of an Impartial
Judiciary issued its Final Report and Recommendations in March
194
The Commission majority proposed a constitutional
2007.
amendment that would substitute retention elections for nonpartisan elections as the method of determining whether
195
incumbent judges would serve another term.
The Commission
also recommended that the governor appoint all Minnesota judges

192. Inst. for Legal Reform, State Res. Ctr.: Minn., http://www.institutefor
legalreform.com/states/state.cfm?state=MN&submit=go (last visited Dec. 27,
2007); see also INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LAWSUIT CLIMATE 2007: RATING THE STATES,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/lawsuitclimate
2007/pdf/Executive_Summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
193. Officials of Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life (MCCL), an antiabortion organization, stated that the group plans to be active in judicial elections.
Barbara L. Jones, With ‘White’ Now the Law, Judicial Races Are in For a Change, MINN.
LAWYER, Jan. 30, 2006. The group has announced that it will support a challenger
to Justice Paul Anderson in 2008. Id. “We’ll be working to replace him with
someone who will not be an activist, will not legislate from the bench, and will
uphold the constitution in its text and history.” Id.
194. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174.
195. Id. at 21–23. This is the third time in the last sixty years in which an
independent commission has recommended adoption of retention elections. The
1948 Constitutional Commission and 1972 Constitutional Study Commission
“urged the adoption of a retention-type election for incumbent judges.” Hon.
Lawrence R. Yetka & Christopher H. Yetka, The Selection and Retention of Judges in
Minnesota, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 169, 174-75 (1994).
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196

from candidates nominated by merit selection commissions.
Presently, there is no statutory requirement that a commission
screen candidates for appellate judgeships, and the governor is
constitutionally free to select district judges regardless of the
197
nominations of the Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection.
Finally, the Commission recommended evaluation of judges’
performances by an independent commission, and publication on
the retention ballot whether the evaluation commission found the
198
judge “qualified” or “not qualified.”
The Commission majority favored retention elections over
non-partisan elections, concluding that retention elections
“promote judicial accountability based on quality and
199
performance.”
The Commission found that “information
regarding the quality and performance of judges” would influence
200
voters in retention elections.
The record in retention election
states showed that a campaign against a specific judge did not
201
influence voters to defeat all the judges on the ballot.
A minority of the Commission favored an appointive model for
202
The proposal called for merit selection and
judicial selection.
gubernatorial appointment, but also for a “judicial-evaluation
commission” rather than the voters in a retention election to
203
determine renewal of judges’ terms.
The proponents of an
appointive system argued that it would diminish the role of
partisanship and money in judicial selection, would “better insulate
judges from electoral politics,” and a judicial-evaluation
commission would be better informed than voters in deciding
204
whether a judge should serve another term.
A second appointive model, requiring legislative confirmation
of gubernatorial appointments and renewals of judges’ terms was
discussed by the Commission, was favored by one member, and has
205
been proposed in the legislature.
The Commission, however,
196. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 11.
197. See MINN. STAT. § 480B.01 (2006).
198. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174.
199. Id. at 22.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see also Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years of Retention Elections: An Update,
37 SOC. SCI. J. 1, 8−11 (2000).
202. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 25-33.
203. Id. at 30−31.
204. Id. at 31.
205. Id. at 33−39; S.F. 324, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007) (sponsored by
Sen. Thomas Neuville). Senator Neuville’s bill would require Senate confirmation
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found little support among its members for legislative involvement
206
in judicial selection.
Retention elections provide a good balance between judicial
207
independence and accountability. This system promotes stability
208
in the bench because it is likely that good judges will be retained.
Retention elections also provide a mechanism to remove a judge
who has behaved badly or whose performance has not been
209
satisfactory. In this system, the citizens have a voice in who serves
210
on the bench, but its structure mitigates partisanship.
B. Financing Elections
In 2004, North Carolina became the first state in the country
211
In
to offer full public financing to appellate court candidates.
2001 New Mexico joined North Carolina by providing full public
212
financing for statewide judicial elections.
In signing the New
Mexico bill into law, Governor Bill Richardson commented that
“[p]ublic financing helps assure that Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court judges can run for office without the pressures of
213
partisan campaigning or fundraising . . . .”
Wisconsin has public financing of judicial elections as well, but
does not fully fund campaigns like systems in North Carolina and

of the governor’s appointments. Id. Elections would be abolished and judges
could apply to the Senate for reappointment after a six-year term. Id.
206. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 33.
207. Aspin et al., supra note 201, at 2. “Merit selection combined with
retention elections is designed to obtain qualified judges, insulate those judges
from political influences by removing partisan politics from the judicial selection
process, and still provide a mechanism for removal of judges through public
accountability.” Id.
208. Id. at 8 (fifty defeated judges out of 3912 retention elections in 1964–
1994). “[R]egular retention voters are very precise in singling out a judge for
defeat” while “retention losses are accompanied by little collateral damage” to
other judges. Id. at 11−12.
209. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 21−22.
210. Aspin, et al., supra note 201, at 1−17.
211. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 163-278.61 (2005); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 131, at
vii.
212. 2007 N.M. Legis. Serv. 1658−63 (West).
213. Press Release, Office of New Mexico Governor, Governor Richardson
Signs Landmark Public Campaign Financing Bill; Makes State Second in Nation
To Provide Public Financing for Statewide Judicial Elections, April 13, 2007,
available at http://governor.state.nm.us/press/2007/april/041307 01.pdf.
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214

New Mexico.
In the 2007 Wisconsin Supreme Court election,
215
The candidates
both candidates declined the public subsidies.
would “have received about $48,000 each if they had agreed to limit
their overall spending to $215,000 and not lent their campaigns
216
However, the candidates each raised
more than $20,000 each.”
217
over $1 million in their campaigns.
Although contributions to Minnesota judicial candidates must
be disclosed publicly, there are no limits on the amount of such
218
contributions. Raising sufficient funds to run an effective judicial
campaign has been difficult, and campaign war chests have been
219
Anticipating potential problems from excessive
relatively small.
campaign contributions in future elections, legislators have
proposed limits on the amount of contributions. One proposal
would limit such contributions to $2000 per contributor in an
220
election year and $500 per contributor in other years.
IX. CONCLUSION
Minnesota’s judicial selection system of appointments and
elections has worked well to maintain a non-partisan, fair and
impartial judiciary. In the last five years, however, the rules of
judicial campaign conduct have changed profoundly. While
Minnesota is better situated than most states to resist partisanship
in its judicial elections, the barriers to partisanship find their basis
in political will, not in legal boundaries. Once ignited, the flames of
partisanship could overcome tradition and culture.
For the third time in the last sixty years, an independent
commission has recommended a constitutional amendment to
adopt retention elections to improve Minnesota’s judicial selection
214. WIS. STAT. § 11.50 (Supp. 2006). Wisconsin has considered fully funded
judicial campaigns. See Mike McCabe, Exec. Dir. Wis. Democracy Campaign,
Campaign Finance Reform in Wisconsin: Where We’ve Been, Where Things Stand Today
and Where We Go From Here (Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.wisdc.org/campfinreform_
progrpt.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
215. Marley, supra note 154.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. MINN. STAT. §10A.20 (2006).
219. See discussion supra Part III.C.
220. S.F. 1558, 85th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007). The 2007 ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct uses the same method of setting contribution limits, with
different limits in election and non-election years, but leaves the actual amounts to
be set by states. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.4(B)(1) (2007),
available at http://abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
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221

process.
Minnesota’s judicial elections already share several
characteristics of retention elections: there are few open seats up
for election; most good judges are not challenged for election;
judges are identified as incumbents on the election ballot; and
222
incumbents can be defeated if they behave or perform badly. As
in retention election states, most judges in Minnesota are
appointed by the governor after nomination by a merit selection
223
commission.
Retention elections strike a good balance between
independence and accountability, and provide more protection
against partisanship than the present election system. Minnesotans
would be wise to make the change to retention elections now,
before judicial selection becomes embroiled in partisanship.

221. CITIZENS COMM’N REPORT, supra note 174, at 22−23 (Appendix C).
222. Id. at 7−8.
223.
It seems clear that Minnesota has adopted its own middle-of-the-road
approach to judicial selection. The open election process has been
retained, but with a quasi-retention feature which simply informs the
voter who the incumbent candidate is and who the challenger is. This
arrangement acts as a check on the gubernatorial appointment process
by keeping the ultimate choice with the voters while, at the same time,
recognizing the unique independent nature of the judicial function.
Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 425 (Minn. 1992).
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